What is the stance of intentional eliminativism?

Intentional eliminativism holds that intentions are conceptual constructions rather than inherent or real entities. Proponents of this view argue that traditional notions of intention and mental states do not accurately reflect how behavior is generated and understood. Instead of viewing intentions as real phenomena that influence our actions, intentional eliminativism suggests that what we call intentions are simply frameworks we use to make sense of behavior.

This perspective challenges the importance attributed to intentions in psychological theories, suggesting that much of what we assume to be deliberate decision-making might be better explained through different mechanisms, such as environmental factors or subconscious processes. By framing intentions as constructed, this view encourages a reevaluation of how psychological phenomena are modeled and understood, leading to potentially more effective explanations and interventions in psychology.

The other options embody contrasting views that affirm the existence and significance of intentions, which intentional eliminativism explicitly seeks to move away from by framing them as non-essential social constructs.